| Biography | |
|---|---|
 Prof. David Yeung Hong Kong Shue Yan University, Hong Kong (China) |
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| Title: Dynamic Games under Durable-strategies and Asynchronous Horizons | |
| Abstract: Asynchronous players’ horizons and durable strategies occur frequently in economic and social activities. Asynchronous players’ horizons may arise from different life spans of agents, different entry and exit times of firms, different terms of elected governments and different durations of leases and contracts. Durable strategies that have effects lasting over a certain period of time are prevalent in real-life situations. Revenue generating investments, toxic waste disposal, durable goods and diffusion of knowledge are vivid examples of durable strategies. This paper establishes a class of dynamic games which incorporates these two frequently observed real-life phenomena – durable strategies and asynchronous horizons. Optimization techniques for dynamic problems involving durable strategies and asynchronous horizons are developed. The non-cooperative equilibrium is characterized. The price of anarchy is evaluated. Cooperative optimization and dynamically stable imputation of the gains to the players are provided. | |
| Biography: Prof. Dr. Dr.h.c. David W. K. Yeung is Distinguished Research Professor and Head of Department of Economics and Finance at Shue Yan University, and Kantorovich Research Chair in Stochastic Differential Games and Co-director of Centre of Game Theory at Saint Petersburg State University.Yeung’s main areas of research are game theory, optimization and stochastic processes.Among Yeung’s pioneering academic work is the origination of the notion of subgame consistency and a generalized theorem for the derivation of analytically tractable subgame consistent solutions which made possible the rigorous study of dynamic stochastic cooperation. Other pioneering academic work accredited to Yeung include – random horizon subgame consistent cooperative solution, randomly furcating differential games, Yeung’s Condition on irrational behaviour proof, stochastic differential games with overlapping generations of uncertain types of players, dynamically consistent solution for cooperative games with asynchronous players’ horizons, solution theorem for feedback Nash equilibria in endogenous horizons differential games, discrete-time random-horizon Bellman equation and HJB equations, stochastic dynamic Slutsky equations, inter-temporal Roy’s identities, cooperative dynamic games with durable controls. He also coauthored with Leon Petrosyan the world’s first books on Cooperative Stochastic Differential Games (Springer), Subgame Consistent Economic Optimization (Birkhauser), Dynamic Shapley Value and Dynamic Nash Bargaining (Nova) and Subgame Consistent Cooperation (Springer). | |
